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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking and Finance at the Interna-
tional Hellenic University.  
Overreaction hypothesis suggests that individuals have the tendency to “overreact” to 
unexpected good or bad news. Literature provides a large number of papers where it is 
examined whether this hypothesis has implementation in the behavior of investors 
concerning equity markets. Additionally, their empirical results, based on logarithmic 
return data, indicate that there is evidence that contrarian strategy can be fruitful for 
long-term periods, by creating portfolios based just on their participant stocks past 
performance. However, this issue has received little attention concerning the German 
stock exchange. After examining eight 36-month non-overlapping portfolio formation 
periods for a three-year time horizon after the formation period, the results argue with 
the strategy’s profitability as the study’s outcomes are both unstable and negative. 
This study indicates that further examination should be conducted on whether the 
phenomenon exists in the German stock market, given that the outcomes obtained in 
the literature are rather robust, putting the used methodology under scrutiny. 
This dissertation would be impossible to have been completed without the supervision 
and constant help of the dissertation’s supervisor Dr Panos K. Pouliasis. Furthermore, I 
would like to thank my family for their constant encouragement and support during 
the whole program. 
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Preface 
This dissertation is made as a completion of the master education in Banking 
and Finace. It is written to fulfill the graduation requirements of the MSc in Banking 
and Finance program at the International Hellenic University. The supervisor on the 
dissertation has been Dr Panos K. Pouliasis. The paper has been made solely by the 
author, however most of the text is based on previous research, conducted by other 
economists, whose work is referenced.  
During the program’s last elective course, named Behavioral Finance, professor 
Spyros I. Spyroy introduced my colleagues and me to the contrarian strategy, a trading 
practice that proposed that profits could be produced by forming portfolios that would 
consist of shares based just on their past performance and not to their fundamentals. I 
was iintrigued by the strategy, because it came in disagreement with the teachings of 
other courses, such as the efficient market hypothesis. I was impressed when I realized 
that it had also motivated many economists to examine whether it actually worked in a 
large number of stock markets around the world. To my great surprise the German 
stock exchange was not thouroughly examined. Therefore, I decided to dedicate my 
dissertation to the investigation of the profitability of the contrarian strategy’s 
implementation in the German stock market. 
Writing the dissertation has been hard, however the whole procedure enabled 
me to learn a lot and understand how this strategy actually works. It cannot express 
the long days spent in front of the computer either searching the databases for 
available data, calculating the results or writing the actual paper, the hope for good 
results and the tiredness or discouragement when hurdles delayed the whole process. 
Fortunately, Dr Pouliasis was always helpful and willing to answer my questions. 
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Panos K. Pouliasis for his support during 
the dissertation. As well, I wish to thank my colleagues for their cooperation and con-
tribution. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for being supportive and 
helpful during my time in the International Hellenic University. If I ever lost interest, 
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you kept me motivated. My parents deserve a particular note of thanks; your wise ad-
vice, encouragement and financial support were vital in order to complete the pro-
gram. 
 At the end, it is you, the reader that I thank for your time! 
 Anastasiadis Konstantinos 
 Thessaloniki, 21/12/2015 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Forecasting the future asset prices has always triggered economists, practition-
ers and academia to find if there is an existing pattern which can lead in safe results. 
Over decades there is a constant effort of achieving this goal using tools such as data 
analysis, implementation of economic theories, data mining, technical analysis, psy-
chology and others.  
 One of the tools mentioned above is the observation made by psychologists 
that there is a tendency among individuals to overreact to new information, resulting 
to attach more weight on it as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). However, 
this phenomenon contradicts the Bayes’ rule. Moreover, according to the efficient 
market hypothesis it is impossible to “beat” the market; shares are always fairly val-
ued, incorporating and reflecting all available information and, on the other hand, all 
agents have rational expectations. But, how is it possible that both suggestions are 
true? How can individuals be both rational and overreacting in the same time?  
Nevertheless, the findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) argue with the pre-
vious theory and upon them a series of studies were based. These results were used by 
economists, such as DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) who examined the US stock ex-
change to show that stock prices overreact to information as well. Actually, what they 
described was the phenomenon in which stocks that in the previous three to five years 
had poor performance, often mentioned as “losers”, tend to outperform returns of 
stocks that had high previous performance, often mentioned as “winners”, for a hold-
ing period of three to five years. This was the basis where a suggested contrarian 
strategy could be established, in which buying prior losers and selling prior winners 
could lead to achieve high abnormal returns. The question that arises in this point is 
how it could be that a stock is simultaneously embodying all the available information 
and triggering the investors to overreact. What is more, the profitability of a strategy 
like the contrarian is intriguing in the sense that an investor is able to earn high profits 
by just monitoring the stocks’ past performances.  
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According to the overreaction hypothesis individuals have the tendency to 
overreact in new information arrivals, but if this is the case the stock prices should be 
overvalued or undervalued all the time. The question that arises here is how this sur-
vives the effects of arbitrage. Additionally, another topic that needs to be investigated 
is that if investors tend to overreact in good or bad news, then they should overbuy or 
oversell the stocks respectively. The fact that this movement is a reaction to the news 
and not reflecting the actual fair value will sooner or later trigger the investors to cor-
rect their positions. Thus, the reverse of the price can now be predicted and placed 
within the next months. As a result the main issue that the dissertation is trying to ex-
plain is whether extreme prior movements in share prices are to be followed by price 
movements in the opposite direction and whether the size of the prior movement re-
sults to larger opposite results.  
 Although the results of the previously mentioned papers had as an outcome of 
many analyses and papers to be produced, concerning various markets and stock ex-
changes, the German stock exchange got rather little attention. In this paper the goal 
is to find out whether such a phenomenon exists in the German stock exchange and, in 
order to make this possible, data concerning the period 1988 – 2014 is used.  
 This dissertation provides results on the contrarian strategy implemented in 
the German stock market and suggests that either the strategy’s profitability does not 
appear in the particular stock exchange or the methodology used should be revised. 
On the same time it suggests ways to improve the methodology in order to detect- if 
any- profits of the contrarian strategy and evidence to the overreaction hypothesis. 
 This paper is not only addressed to researchers who want to investigate the 
German stock market’s behavior as far as the overreaction hypothesis is concerned, 
but it is useful for any investor who wants to trade in the German stock exchange and 
wants to discover whether the contrarian strategy is profitable. 
 The remainder of this research is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature found on the overreaction hypothesis and the outcome of the implementa-
tion of the contrarian strategy. The next chapter deals with the data and methodology 
used to conduct the empirical tests. Chapter 4 discusses the results of the performed 
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empirical tests and it is followed by the next chapter that provides suggestions for fur-
ther research. Finally, the paper ends with a summary of conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Many papers and articles were produced trying to find whether the implementation of 
a contrarian strategy is profitable and whether it actually beats the market by achiev-
ing high abnormal returns. Besides, many economists tried to give explanations about 
the phenomenon. 
According to the Bayes’ rule agents are rational and they shape their beliefs 
and expectations in a correct way taking into consideration a prior base rate, so as to 
weight the influence of previous and new information. However, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) imply that agents tend to attach less weight on past data and rather 
overweight new information. This suggestion is based on the representativeness heu-
ristic, which asserts that agents tend to disregard base rate frequencies. This observa-
tion was used in many researches including ones trying to explain the investors’ behav-
ior. 
This new tool was used in the explanatory quest, among others, concerning the 
investors’ decision making. If investors actually overreact when new information ar-
rives maybe further explanation could be found on how asset prices move. De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985, 1987) provided significant evidence trying to show the existence of 
overreaction on a log run basis. Disproportionate optimism when good news occur and 
exaggerated pessimism over bad news trigger asset prices to fluctuate. They managed 
to show that, in the US market, if an investor selects extreme prior loser stocks and 
extreme prior winner ones for a prior period of three to five years and compare their 
performance for an upcoming period of three to five years as well, the result would be 
the outperformance of the losers against the winners. Consequently, if an investor 
forms a portfolio by buying the first and selling the latter, she can achieve high abnor-
mal returns in the long run. In other words the formation of a zero-investment portfo-
lio that consists of long positions on the prior losers and short ones on the prior win-
ners should produce positive returns, higher than the market’s, over a certain period 
of time (Dreman, 1998). Furthermore, Fama and French (1992) after analyzing US mar-
ket data suggest that some investors tend to extrapolate past performances too far 
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into the future or assume that a good investment would be just to buy a firm with high 
growth, achieving high sales and/or earnings regardless its stock price. As a result they 
get excited about companies that had a good run in the previous years and get a long 
position on them in order to acquire profits, assuming that this course is going to pro-
ceed. The outcome is that these, so called “glamour” stocks become overpriced. On 
the contrary, overreaction occurs when the returns of a stock are continuously poor. In 
this case investors oversell these stocks, causing them to become underpriced. On top 
of that, when the courses of these stocks do not meet their inflated or deflated expec-
tations they tend to get “disappointed” and lead to the reversion of their beliefs react-
ing on the opposite direction by getting the opposite positions. As a result the extreme 
previous “winners” become losers and vice versa. Moreover, Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
provide evidence supporting the effectiveness of a contrarian strategy due to behav-
ioral reasons. They argue that this is a result of excessive risk concerning the prior 
“loser” or “value” stocks. Furthermore, Barberis et al. (1998) propose that the repre-
sentative heuristic bias triggers the extrapolation of past results in the investor’s effort 
to forecast future performance. 
In addition, further trading practices and investor strategies are studies by a 
number of papers. More specifically, among other studies, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) produce the conclusion that the contrarian strategy is not the only profitable 
available strategy based just in the shares’ past performance, but there is also the 
momentum strategy. The principles of the strategy are roughly the same with the con-
trarian strategy. There is also a formation and a testing period when portfolios of ex-
treme prior “loser” and “winner” stocks are formed and examined respectively. The 
main differences are the length of the time horizon concerning both the formation and 
testing periods, which vary in literature between (in both cases) three to twelve 
months and the fact that, instead selling the “winners” portfolio and buying the “los-
ers” one, the momentum strategy suggests exactly the opposite. Moreover, Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) result that the profits of the momentum strategy are not the out-
come of the extra risk exposure of the trading strategy, or the product of delayed reac-
tions to information about a common factor, but they are consistent with lagged stock 
price reactions to firm-specific information.   
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Following the overreaction phenomenon various papers have tried to explain 
the reasons that lead to abnormal returns since an investor adopts the contrarian 
strategy. Chan (1988) tried to interpret this violation of the weakest form of market 
efficiency with a study that concluded to the outcome that the risks of the stocks con-
sisting the zero-investment portfolio are changing over time, thus the excess returns 
are just compensation to the investors for the extra risk exposure. Moreover, Ball et al. 
(1995) argue on the effectiveness of the contrarian strategy based on measurement 
problems that they expose. On the other hand, Zarowin (1989, 1990) provides evi-
dence of a possible January effect which influences all the stock prices and especially 
the smaller ones. Besides, he offers another possible interpretation based on the dif-
ference between the sizes of the selected stocks that take place in the zero-investment 
portfolio. Conrad and Kaul (1993) in their effort to examine the strength of a contrari-
an strategy argued their colleagues idea revealing methodological flaws due to asyn-
chronous trading and price discreteness. They claim that when accumulating returns 
not only true numbers are calculated but also an upward bias because of the cumulat-
ing process used. Moreover, they eliminate any abnormal returns by implying that only 
excessive returns are a result of piling January effects. 
Further work was produced concerning equity markets outside the United 
States. Ahmet and Nusret (1999) find profits when a contrarian strategy, as described 
before, is implemented in seven non-US countries. Chang et al. (1995) searched the 
Japanese market for the same phenomenon and found evidence as well but for a 
shorter time period. Furthermore, Chui (2000) found abnormal profits after adopting 
contrarian strategies in South Korea, Hammed and Ting (2000) examined the Malaysi-
an stock exchange and Kang (2002) did the same for the Chinese market.  Research 
also took part in Europe where, among others, Antoniou et al. (2003) after studying 
the UK market suggested the existence of abnormal returns when contrarian strategies 
are used. Following the same research, evidence was found in France by Brouwer et al.  
(1997), in Italy by Mengoli (2004) and in Spain as well by Forner and Marhuenda 
(2003). In addition, Stein (1989) and Mao et al. (1989) provide significant evidence that 
a contrarian strategy may be used in other markets, such as options and futures on 
treasury bonds. 
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Surprisingly, little work has been done concerning the German Stock exchange 
and the profitability of contrarian strategy in this market. Schireck, DeBondt and We-
ber (1999) studied the German stock market for the period 1961-1991 and managed to 
provide evidence that the implementation of a contrarian strategy can beat the mar-
ket, but simultaneously seem to worry about transaction costs produced by buying and 
selling stocks. They report unexpected similarity in their results in comparison with the 
US market, even though there are profound divergences between the two countries in 
social, cultural and economic matters.  They suggest that this is a result of common 
behavioral and psychological issues that determine stock prices globally. 
In order to understand whether the implication of contrarian strategy is effec-
tive in the German equity market, the profitability of “winner” (glamour) and “loser” 
(value) stocks is examined; besides, zero-cost portfolios are formed for a three year 
testing period. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Data 
Defining the Contrarian Strategy 
The contrarian strategy suggested in this paper consists of distinguishing the 
sum of the stocks listed in the German Stock Exchange into “winners” and “losers”. 
Winners are these stocks that have managed to have the best performance over the 
previous three years before they are selected to be part of the “winners” portfolio. On 
the other hand, losers are defined as the stocks that suffered by the worst 
performance during the same period as mentioned above, so as to be selected in the 
“losers” portfolio. Thus, both porfolios are based on the criteria of past results. After 
doing so, a zero-investment portfolio can be created, in which the investor is going to 
take a long position in the “losers” porfolio and sell or short-sell the “winners” one. 
Data 
 The data used in order to study the contrarian strategy in the German stock 
exchange comes from the Bloomberg and ThomsonOne databases.  The data acquired 
are the historical prices of the shares in the end of each month adjusted for dividends, 
seasoned equity offerings and splits. Historical prices of every stock that was trading 
for at least three consecutive years (the formation period) in the German stock 
exchange were downloaded for the time period between the beginning of 1988 and 
the end of 2014. Thus, the aggregate time period under evaluation was 324 months 
and it concerned 1083 firms. In order for a share to be eligible for this paper, not only 
had to be trading for 36 consecutive months, but also, to have been traded for at least 
one month after the previous time frame. As far as the proxy used to describe the 
market’s behavior in matters of return, the historical prices of the DAX index were also 
downloaded from the databases mentioned above. The time frame was the same as 
above. The DAX index was launched on 1988 by the Deutsche Boerse AG, the firm that 
owns and runs the Frankfurt stock market, coming to replace the previous “Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zetung (FAZ) Aktienindex”. It is a value-weighted index based on the mar-
ket capitalization of the shares that take part in its composition. It contains the thirty 
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largest and best-performing companies in the German stock market and its composi-
tion is reviewed once a year, in September. 
Methodology 
The empirical tests trying to find evidence on the existence of contrarian profits 
come in various designs. For the purpose of this paper the methodology used to test 
the overreaction hypothesis is coming from the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) study. So, 
the tests used examine whereas systematic nonzero residual returns exist in next 24 
and 36 months after the portfolios formation. Fama (1976) suggested that the 
phenomenon can be examined through the efficient market’s condition: 
E (Ṙjt – Em( Ṙjt | F mt-1)| Ft-1 ) = E(ῡjt | Ft-1) = 0 
Where, 
 Ft-1 stand for the whole set of information available at time t -1, 
 Ṙjt  is the return of stock j at time t  
 Em( Ṙjt | F mt-1) is the expected return of the stock j at time t as estimated by the 
market on the ground of the information set F mt-1. 
According to the efficient market hypothesis E(ῡWt| Ft-1 ) = E(ῡLt| Ft-1 ) = 0. However, 
the overreaction hypothesis proposes that E(ῡWt| Ft-1 ) < 0 and E(ῡLt| Ft-1 ) > 0 meaning 
that the expected residual return behavior as assesed on the basis of the information 
set Ft-1 concerning the “winners” portfolio should be negative. On the contrary, the 
expected residual return behavior as assesed on the basis of the information set Ft-1 
concerning the “losers” portfolio should be positive. 
 Generally three types of return residuals should be used when the empirical 
tests take place. These are the market-adjusted abnormal returns, market model 
residuals and abnormal returns calculated according to the Sharpe-Lintner proposition 
of the CAPM. Yet, all of the above are based on single-index models that derive from 
the CAPM so misspecification problems may still affected the studies’ outcomes. 
According to DeBondt (1985), model misspecification problems, which may affect the 
  -11- 
results due to econometric biases, may also be found in the market-adjusted and the 
market model residuals, if the actual model is described by more than one factors. 
Besides, he suggests that if the portfolios lack resemblance in matters of risk, it is not 
safe to decide whether the empirical results provide evidence about the market’s form 
of efficiency or about existence of overreaction in the market. 
 The outcomes of the study do not alter whichever of the three types of return 
residuals mentioned before is examined. Thus, the examination which will follow will 
be based on monthly market-adjusted abnormal returns of the sampled assets in order 
to proceed to the stock selection to form the portfolios. The formula used to estimate 
the returns at the end of each month is the following: 
Ujt = Rjt – Rmt        t = 1, ... , n 
where 
 n= 1 , ... , 36 
 Ujt is the difference between the logarithmic return of stock j at time t and the 
logarithmic return of the market index, 
 Rjt is the logarithmic return of the of stock j at time t, 
 Rmt is the logarithmic return of the DAX index, which is used as a proxy for the 
market’s behavior in the German stock exchange. 
Afterwards, return data on a monthly frequency for German Stock Exchange common 
stocks is used for the time period between January 1988 and December 2014.  The 
same time period is used to examine the German stock market’s behavior. Each stock j 
with successive data for at least 36 months is examined, for which the next 24 and 36 
monthly residual returns are estimated. In the case that there are no data after the 
first 36 months, the returns are estimated until when there is available data. This 
process is followed 8 times.  So the cumulative excess returns can now be estimated 
(denoted as ∑Ujt ) for the previous 36 months, the so called portfolio formation peri-
od. This process is repeated for each 36-month formation period for a total 8 non-
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overlapping periods. At the end of each period the cumulative excess returns are 
ranked from low to high, so as to choose the suitable assets that will be part of the 
“winner” and “loser” portfolios. The top 20 stocks form the equally weighted winner 
portfolio W and the 20 stocks that had the worst performance are picked to form the 
equally weighted loser portfolio L. The only criterion which is used to form the two 
portfolios is the past 36-month (before t=0) performance of the stocks in matters of 
excess returns. 
 Subsequently, the cumulative average residual returns of the next 24 and 36 
months periods (test periods) should be calculated for all stocks that participate in 
both portfolios for each of 8 non-overlapping formation periods (n=1,…, 16). Since the 
whole process is finished the CARW, n, t and the CARL, n, t can be found. If there is a stock 
that is delisted from the stock market in the test period, it is dropped from the portfo-
lio and then the cumulative average of the residual returns is the average of the re-
maining residual returns.  
 Having acquired the CAR’s for all the 8 test periods, average CAR’s are comput-
ed for portfolios W and L so as to obtain ACARW,t and ACARL,t respectively. According to 
the overreaction hypothesis for time t>0, ACARW,t should be negative and, on the con-
trary, ACARL,t should be positive. Thus, ACARL,t – ACARW,t should be positive. Moreover, 
this difference between the average CAR’s should be tested for statistical significance 
so as to actually reject or not the overreaction hypothesis.  
Test procedures 
Therefore, by following the DeBondt and Thaler’s (1985) methodology the 
sample’s variance should be estimated. The formula that derives it is the following: 
St2 = [ ∑Nn=1 ( CARW,n,t  - ACARW,t )2 + ∑Nn=1 ( CARL,n,t  - ACARL,t )2 ] / 2* (N – 1) 
The two samples have the same size N, so the variance of the difference of sample 
means equals 2*St2/N. Thus, the t-statistic is derived by the formula: 
Tt = [ACARL,t - ACARW,t] / [2*St2/N]1/2 
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According to Emambocus and Dhesi (2009), both this difference (ACARL,t – ACARW,t) and 
its statistical significance are the points that reveal the aspect of the overreaction hy-
pothesis, in which is constructed  the contrarian strategy. The investor who follows this 
strategy tries to make profits by investing in a way that differs from others, depending 
on nothing else but the stocks’ past performance and not trying to identify and exploit 
any mispricing in the stock exchange. 
Furthermore, aiming to decide if, for any month t after the portfolios’ formations, the 
average residual return makes a contribution to ACARW,t or ACARL,t , a t-test of signifi-
cance can be run to find out if their difference is not zero. The sample standard devia-
tion of the portfolio W is calculated by the following formula 
st = [∑Nn=1 ( ARW,n,t  - ARW,t )2 / (N -1)]1/2 
The standard error of ARW,t  is  estimated by the division  st/√N. Therefore the t-statistic 
is derived by the formula: 
Tt = ARW,t / (st/√N) 
Respectively, for the portfolio L the sample standard deviation is calculated by the fol-
lowing formula 
st = [∑Nn=1 ( ARL,n,t  - ARL,t )2 / (N -1)]1/2 
The standard error of ARL,t  is  estimated by the division  st/√N. Therefore the t-statistic 
is derived by the formula: 
Tt = ARL,t / (st/√N) 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
 After obtaining the data as described previously, and after following the meth-
odology, the empirical results are presented for explanation and further discussion. 
Test A 
 Although the contrarian strategy is based on the difference of the average cu-
mulative abnormal residual returns of the “losers” and the “winners” portfolio, the re-
sults of the tests are both contradictory and statistically non-significant. The results of 
both tests(the one concerning the difference between ACAR’s of both portfolios and 
the second concerning the impact of the average residual returns to the ACAR’s of the 
two portfolios) are presented are presented on the tables A and B.  The results of the 
first test suggest that the null hypothesis is failed to be rejected. In the most of the ex-
amined months (month 1 after the formation period through the 36th month after the 
portfolios are formed) the difference between the ACAR’s of “losers” and “winners” 
portfolios is a negative number, proposing that there is no overreaction concerning the 
German stock exchange for the years 1988 to 2014.  Actually, only in four out of 36 
months after the portfolios’ formation the result is a positive number as the overreac-
tion hypothesis suggests. Furthermore, the ACAR’s of the extreme prior “losers” port-
folio is above zero just in one month out of the 36 examined. As explained before, the 
contrarian strategy is based on the existence of high profits derived by shorting the 
extreme prior “winners” portfolio and taking a long position on the extreme prior “los-
ers” portfolio. Since the results indicate that the “losers” portfolio yields negative re-
turns and simultaneously the “winners” portfolio returns are larger the whole contrar-
ian strategy is viewed with skepticism.  
 Moreover, the t-statistics concerning the differences of the ACAR’s between 
the two portfolios are less than the critical value of 1.96 for a 95% confidence interval 
indicating a lack of statistical significance about the results.  On top of that, the critical 
value is not met in none of the examined 36 months after the portfolios creation. This 
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brings up the question whether the overreaction phenomenon has no implication in 
the German stock market.    
 The results of the first test imply that the data provide little or no evidence that 
the null hypothesis is false, but simultaneously they do not show evidence that the ex-
amined hypothesis is true either. The problem lies on the fact that it is impossible to 
distinguish a null impact from a very small one. Therefore, no credible evidence is 
found to suggest the success of the implementation of a contrarian strategy, such as 
described before. The conducted test fails to reject the null hypothesis. In other words 
the test does not provide statistical evidence that the difference between the two 
portfolios’ ACAR’s is not due to chance. Thus, the contrarian strategy yields non-
significantly a negative return for every month examined after the portfolios’ for-
mation. 
Test B 
The second test is aiming to obtain results which can help the examiner to find 
out, whether for any examined month after the portfolios formation, the average 
residual return makes an impact on either the ACAR of the “winners” or “losers” 
portfolio. The null hypothesis here is that the average residual returns are different 
from zero. 
 The results are presented on the Table B. After examining all the 36 months 
after the portfolios creation the results show that the average abnormal returns are in 
fact different from zero in all months for both cases, either the extreme prior 
“winners” or the extreme prior “losers” portfolio. On top of that there are several 
cases where they show large divergence. However, in most of the months the results 
are statistically non-significant as they do not manage to meet or overcome the critical 
value of the 1.96 in absolute value as far as the t-statistic is concerned. From the sum 
of the 36 months examined, only in 10 months the results where statistically signifi-
cant for the “losers” portfolio. On the other hand, when the same test was conducted 
for the “winners” portfolio the results were statistically significant in just 5 months. 
Additionally, just in three cases results were found to be statistically significant in the 
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same month for both portfolios and in each case the average residual returns concern-
ing the “winners” portfolio surpassed the ones of the “losers” portfolio. 
It should be noted here that for each of the eight non-overlapping three year 
periods examined, the first month after the portfolios formation was always the month 
January, so the presence of the January effect may be detected. This phenomenon im-
plies that at the end of each January the returns are positive regardless the existence 
of new information arrivals or any changes in the fundamentals of the firms. It is a, so 
called, calendar effect which is explained by Schwert (1983) through the tax-loss selling 
hypothesis, where it is proposed that investors due, mainly, to tax reasons tend to sell 
off their assets in December and retake positions on January after the Christmas holi-
days. Although, in almost all Januaries examined the result was positive, as expected 
due to January effect, the results were never found to be statistically significant, so as 
to support the hypothesis that there is proof of the existence of the effect. Moreover, 
on Januaries the “losers” portfolio managed to surpass the “winners” portfolio just 
once, at the beginning of the second year after the portfolios formation, despite the 
fact that in all cases for the months before the year’s end the results were always neg-
ative. 
 
Discussion 
 The outcomes of the conducted tests come in a possible disagreement with the 
papers that have already been mentioned in the literature review, which suggest at 
least the existence of the overreaction hypothesis and, in some papers, the profitabil-
ity of the implementation of a contrarian strategy in equity markets. There are possible 
explanations of the test results that may be split in two main categories. The first ques-
tions the phenomenon itself and the second the examined data and the applied meth-
odology. 
 There are economists who propose, through their works that following a con-
trarian strategy does not lead necessarily to high abnormal returns, such as Tornau 
who examines the Indian stock exchange (2011) or that the presented abnormal re-
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turns are not the outcome of the investors’ overreaction, but just the difference be-
tween the risks related to the two portfolios, such as Chan (1988). Chan proposes that 
the extreme prior “losers” portfolio’s risk, measured by beta, augments after a period 
of excessive loss. On the other hand, the “winners” portfolio’s risk mitigates after a 
period of abnormal gain. Moreover, Chan suggests that the contrarian strategy tends 
to pick riskier “losers”, probably because these stocks tend to experience larger losses 
at hard times in the economy rather than at periods of growth. Thus, the reported ab-
normal returns are just the compensation offered to the investor for investing in these 
stocks.  
 Furthermore, another possible explanation on the results derived after the pro-
cess described in the methodology section and their lack of significance is that the 
overreaction hypothesis is not apparent in the German stock exchange. Investors tak-
ing part in the German stock market may decide on which position to take against the 
stocks just by interpreting their fundamentals or after evaluating any new information 
arrival and decide whether to buy or sell the asset. Thus, the stock market appears to 
be efficient on the way news is spread through the market and that the investors are 
rational and not affected by behavioral biases, such as the representativeness heuristic 
or herding. According to the efficient market hypothesis it is impossible to beat the 
market because share prices always reflect all relevant information. Thus, stocks are 
always traded in their fair values making and investors are unable to purchase under-
valued stocks or go short on stocks with inflated prices. In other words, the efficient 
market hypothesis suggests that is not possible to outperform the market through any 
stock selection and that the only way to yield higher returns is by higher risk exposure.  
Although, this explanation is plausible after the data examination, it comes in disa-
greement with all the papers presented in the literature review part, which support 
the overreaction hypothesis and the presented profitability of the contrarian strategy, 
even in the German stock market as Schireck et al (1999) suggest. 
 On the other hand, a second category of possible explanations may be suggest-
ed. These deal with the methodology process and possible flaws that may cause prob-
lems of relevance and significance in the results. The methodology used was the same 
as presented in the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) study. Whereas, the procedure worked 
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just fine in their study and in others that followed, it was criticized by other econo-
mists, such as Fama and French (1992), Conrad and Kaul (1993) or Kothari and Warner 
(1997), who also examined the implementation of the contrarian strategy. According 
to their studies the usage of just the difference between the monthly returns of the 
securities and the monthly return of the market in order to produce the monthly mar-
ket-adjusted abnormal returns is not adequate enough to examine the phenomenon. 
Thus, they propose other methodologies that are also able to produce the monthly 
abnormal returns. These are, according to Kothari and Warner, the “market model”, 
which derives the abnormal returns through a regression of the stock’s monthly re-
turns on the equal-weighted market returns over the formation period; the “CAPM 
method” that derives the monthly abnormal returns through the regression of the 
CAPM model; the “Fama-French three factor model” which computes the monthly ab-
normal returns through regressing each stock’s monthly return above a risk-free in-
vestment on the market’s monthly return above the return of the risk-free investment, 
a book-to-market factor return and a size factor return. They actually managed to find 
results about the CAR’s that their statistical significance was greater than the out-
comes of the DeBondt and Thaler methodology. 
 Moreover, the produced results by the tests A and B are based on some arbi-
trary choices made in order to conduct the tests. Some of them were made due to 
practical reasons and others because they were also used in a number of other papers 
studying the same phenomenon. The availability of data was one of the main reasons 
that lead to the choice of conducting the tests having in hand data concerning a 36-
month formation period. This arbitrary choice about the length of the period used to 
form both “winners” and “losers” portfolios was made in order to produce at least 
eight periods available for testing, as data were available just for years from 1988 on-
wards. This had as an outcome the number of test periods when the portfolios were 
tested to be rather small to provide solid results. The number of the periods was used 
in order not only to find the sample’s variance, but also to produce the t-statistic value 
in order to judge whether the results are statistically significant or not. There is skepti-
cism on whether smaller or larger non-overlapping formation periods would produce 
better results from a statistical point of view. On top of that with a larger formation 
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period would disqualify some of the stocks that actually took part in the “losers” port-
folio, since some of these shares suffering from abnormal losses in a large period of 
time did not manage to survive through the whole testing period causing the portfolio 
to shrink and maybe affect the results. In addition, the test-period was influenced also 
by the lack of data before 1988. In other papers the time horizon of the test periods 
used to examine the contrarian strategy vary through a two to five years horizon pro-
ducing more robust results.  The fact that the sample’s population was just eight is 
possible to have affected the strength of the results presented before. 
 Furthermore, the number of the shares that participated in either the “losers” 
portfolio or the “winners” one was also arbitrary. Both portfolios consist of twenty 
stocks on the first month of the test period. As long as a stock ceased to be available in 
the German stock exchange it automatically was dropped from the portfolio. Then, the 
number of the consisting stocks decreased and the available data were less causing a 
possible impact on the robustness of the results. In other papers the number of the 
securities picked to participate in the portfolios is also arbitrary and varies. Other stud-
ies tend to use percentiles, e.g. top and bottom deciles, in order to conclude to the 
number of stocks that take part in the two portfolios and others tend to choose a 
number in an ad hoc basis. Part of a possible explanation on the results’ lack of statisti-
cal significance may lay here. 
 Besides, the methodology proposed that the securities returns should be mar-
ket-adjusted. In other words, the shares’ returns above the market’s returns were to 
be examined. In order to do this a proxy, which could describe the market’s behavior 
had to be used. Once again the choice was made arbitrarily and the chosen proxy was 
the DAX Index. This choice influenced the data to the core, since the very first step was 
to produce the difference between the returns of each of the available shares in the 
stock market and the returns on the market’s proxy.  It is possible that the usage of 
another index used as a market proxy could have led to different results that might 
had enhanced the results. There is a chance that if the CDAX index was used in the ap-
plied methodology the results to be stronger. The CDAX is a composite index of all 
stocks traded in the Frankfurt stock market and not just a value-weighted index of thir-
ty blue-chip German firms. The fact that CDAX takes into consideration all the move-
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ments of the shares and not just a small in population, but great in total market capi-
talization number of stocks may have driven to more representative results. In 
Schiereck’s et al. (1999) study on the contrarian and momentum strategies applied al-
so in the German stock exchange the index that was used as a market proxy was the 
DAX’s “ancestor”, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zetung (FAZ) Aktienindex. This was the 
main index used at the time, before the introduction of DAX, composed as a value-
weighted index of 100 large German companies. The differences between the ways 
the indices were constructed may alter the results of the abnormal residuals and lead 
to different outcomes. 
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Chapter 5: Suggestions for further empirical work 
The outcomes of this study come in disagreement with a number of previous 
papers. Most of them conclude that a contrarian strategy is profitable regardless the 
reasons triggering to this result. On the other hand, many economists argue with the 
phenomenon’s profitability and propose that the high positive results are either com-
pensation due to extra risk exposure or that the results suffer from a number of biases 
that trigger to high differences between the average cumulative abnormal returns of 
the “losers” portfolios and the ”winners” one.  
Although, the results that this work provides are not strong, there are conclu-
sions that can help further empirical work to be produced. The fact that this paper’s 
outcomes suggest non-significant negative differences between the two portfolios may 
lead to new interesting studies of the German stock market concerning the last 27 
years. New papers may be written using different methodologies or even different da-
ta usage. Moreover, the effort to find stronger results that may or may not agree with 
this paper’s findings is a factor that can encourage researchers to further research.  
New empirical works may be conducted by using other methodologies to ob-
tain the returns of the stocks, such as the implementation of the Fama and French 
(1992) three factor model or the CAPM model, rather than the difference between the 
logarithmic returns of the stocks and the DAX index. Moreover, other indices may be 
used to derive the returns of the German stock exchange in order to describe more 
accurately the market’s behavior. Such an index could be the CDAX index, which is a 
composite index that consists of all the shares trading in the German stock market, ra-
ther than the DAX index which is affected only by the 30 strongest stocks. 
Furthermore, tests that differ from the study’s methodology concerning the 
length of both the formation and the testing periods may be conducted. In literature 
there is a variation about the time period used especially when the two portfolios are 
to be formed. This paper is based on a three-year formation period, yet other econo-
mists tend to examine the stock market for five years before ranking the shares to cre-
ate the portfolios. On the other hand, some are making use of a 12-month formation 
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period. Each time horizon comes with its advantages or disadvantages, such as the 
survival bias when the time period is rather short or the small number of non-
overlapping periods when the time horizon is longer. 
Additionally, new works may concern the January effect and its impact on the 
shares’ behavior. According to the results of this study the January effect does not af-
fect crucially the shares’ prices in the German stock market. However, it is important 
that further empirical wok should be conducted since this paper’s methodology is 
based on obtaining returns based just on the differences between the logarithmic re-
turns of the stocks and the DAX index. It is concluded that the January effect is rather 
not significantly inflating the stocks’ returns.  
Moreover, new papers should examine the differences between the risks of the 
“winners” and “losers” portfolios and find out the correlation, if any, between the 
portfolios’ risk exposure and their returns. If contrarian strategy profitability evidence 
is provided, it is important to ascertain whether the contrarian strategy profits are due 
to high risk exposure or due to the investors’ behavior, described by the representa-
tiveness heuristic, herding, anchoring or overreaction to the shares’ past performance. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The main goal of the dissertation was to explore how the German stock ex-
change functions and behaves under the scope of the overreaction hypothesis. Addi-
tionally, the way that participants in the stock market interact and react to available 
information was under investigation. Besides, the analysis of the results of the imple-
mentation of a contrarian strategy in the same stock market was to be explored and 
possible explanations to be presented.   
After research in psychology conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) it was 
suggested by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) that investors violate the Bayes’ rule and 
tend to overreact to new information arrivals. This exaggerated reaction tends to over-
shoot the stock prices when the news is good, because investors form high expecta-
tions on the future movements of these stocks. On the other hand, when bad news 
arrives, investors tend to reduce the stock prices more than the impact of the news 
indicate causing the stock prices to become undervalued. In literature this phenome-
non is highly investigated in many stock markets around the globe by implementing 
the contrarian strategy, which indicates forming two portfolios, one consisting of the 
top prior “loser” stocks and another consisting of the top prior “winner” stocks, and 
taking a long position on the first and a short on the latter. 
After following the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) methodology and performing 
the empirical tests the results on the differences between the average cumulative ab-
normal residual returns of the two portfolios were non-significantly contradictory. 
Thus, it is impossible to actually tell whether the “losers” portfolio outperforms the 
“winners” one and propose that the contrarian strategy is either profitable or insignifi-
cant.   
However, two main categories of explanations are presented; the first dealing 
with theoretical problems of the strategy and the second with issues concerning the 
methodology. Research on the first category suggests that the strategy is not profita-
ble and that there is no overreaction phenomena present. Moreover, it is proposed 
(Chan, 1998) that any detected differences are due to extra risk exposure issues con-
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cerning the two portfolios or that the spread between the two portfolios’ returns are 
due to measurement issues (Conrad and Kaul, 1993).  
Possible explanations concerning the methodology are also provided. In the lit-
erature about the contrarian strategy there is a variance of the methodology and data 
applied in order to conduct the empirical tests. Researchers use not only different time 
horizons on the formation period, but also in the testing one producing stronger re-
sults. Moreover, different proxies of the market behavior are used and not only the 
main blue-chip weighted value indices of each stock exchange. There are also varia-
tions on the way that the securities returns are calculated. Four main models are used. 
In addition to the market-adjusted returns model, which was adopted in this paper, 
the market model, the CAPM model and the Fama and French three-factor model are 
adopted in the literature as well.  What is more, literature methodology varies over the 
number of stocks that participate in the two portfolios, either using percentiles to de-
cide how many stocks to include or arbitrary pick a number of stocks. 
It is clear that several aspects of the results remain without sufficient explana-
tion and that to resolve this problem further research has to be conducted by future 
researchers including views like the detection of January effects or other market 
anomalies that may be used to offer explanations to the contrarian strategy results. 
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Appendix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
-0,032 -0,012 -0,005 -0,005 -0,007 -0,004 -0,005 -0,004 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,006
0,026 0,021 0,017 0,008 0,008 0,008 0,003 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,000 -0,001
0,000 -0,002 0,000 0,006 0,004 0,003 -0,008 -0,003 -0,007 -0,004 -0,007 -0,009
0,009 -0,034 -0,018 -0,006 -0,003 -0,004 -0,008 -0,008 -0,007 -0,009 -0,005 -0,007
-0,024 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,032 0,033 0,025 0,031 0,039 0,038 0,029 0,011
-0,014 -0,006 -0,009 -0,010 -0,013 -0,011 -0,011 -0,015 -0,018 -0,020 -0,020 -0,021
0,031 0,033 -0,005 0,007 0,015 0,007 -0,007 -0,002 -0,005 -0,004 -0,009 -0,011
-0,044 -0,031 -0,005 -0,042 -0,038 -0,041 -0,038 -0,037 -0,037 -0,040 -0,044 -0,044
ACARL -0,006 -0,004 -0,002 -0,005 0,000 -0,001 -0,006 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,008 -0,011
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
-0,019 -0,017 -0,008 -0,008 -0,009 -0,001 -0,004 -0,002 -0,002 -0,003 -0,002 -0,003
-0,003 0,005 0,002 -0,002 -0,001 0,003 0,001 -0,001 0,000 -0,001 0,000 0,000
0,028 0,003 0,000 0,002 -0,003 -0,004 -0,011 -0,005 -0,007 -0,002 0,002 -0,003
0,020 -0,012 -0,005 -0,005 -0,003 0,001 0,000 0,007 0,005 -0,001 0,000 -0,003
0,030 0,032 0,030 0,012 0,011 0,005 0,003 0,000 0,003 -0,001 -0,001 -0,002
0,057 0,022 -0,004 0,011 -0,003 -0,007 -0,007 -0,001 -0,003 -0,006 -0,005 -0,006
0,036 0,035 0,015 -0,003 0,001 0,007 -0,002 -0,006 -0,008 -0,006 -0,009 -0,009
-0,072 -0,032 -0,035 -0,027 -0,018 -0,014 -0,023 -0,024 -0,024 -0,022 -0,020 -0,020
ACARW 0,010 0,005 -0,001 -0,003 -0,003 -0,001 -0,005 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,004 -0,006
-0,016 -0,008 -0,002 -0,003 0,003 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,000 -0,003 -0,005
-0,908 -0,697 -0,217 -0,358 0,324 0,001 -0,129 -0,083 -0,004 -0,038 -0,440 -0,833
0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
ACARL  -  ACARW
t-STAT
MONTHS AFTER PORTFOLIO CREATION
WINNERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
FORMATION PERIOD MONTHS AFTER PORTFOLIO CREATION
LOSERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
   
 Table A - Differences in Cumulative Average (Market-Adjusted) Residual Returns Between the Winner and Loser Portfolios into months 1-12 of the Test 
period  
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
-0,005 -0,005 -0,004 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005
0,000 -0,002 -0,001 -0,002 -0,003 -0,002 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,004 -0,004 -0,005
-0,009 -0,008 -0,010 -0,009 -0,010 -0,012 -0,012 -0,010 -0,010 -0,011 -0,011 -0,010
-0,007 -0,003 -0,001 -0,003 -0,003 -0,005 -0,005 -0,003 -0,001 -0,004 -0,006 -0,008
0,020 0,021 0,017 0,010 0,008 0,008 0,007 0,004 0,003 0,002 0,003 0,000
-0,018 -0,014 -0,010 -0,013 -0,014 -0,015 -0,016 -0,017 -0,017 -0,017 -0,017 -0,018
-0,008 -0,009 -0,014 -0,014 -0,015 -0,016 -0,018 -0,016 -0,006 -0,007 -0,007 -0,007
-0,038 -0,036 -0,035 -0,034 -0,032 -0,030 -0,030 -0,028 -0,028 -0,027 -0,025 -0,025
ACARL -0,008 -0,007 -0,007 -0,009 -0,009 -0,010 -0,010 -0,010 -0,008 -0,009 -0,009 -0,010
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
-0,006 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,006 -0,005 -0,005 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,004
0,000 -0,001 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001
-0,002 -0,003 -0,003 -0,002 -0,012 -0,004 -0,005 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,004 -0,004
-0,004 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,001 -0,002 -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,002 -0,003
-0,002 -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001
-0,004 -0,004 -0,003 -0,004 -0,004 -0,005 -0,003 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,006 -0,006
-0,006 -0,005 -0,007 -0,006 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,004 -0,006 -0,005 -0,005 -0,015
-0,017 -0,014 -0,013 -0,003 -0,012 -0,011 -0,010 -0,010 -0,010 -0,010 -0,012 -0,013
ACARW -0,005 -0,004 -0,004 -0,003 -0,005 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,006
-0,003 -0,002 -0,003 -0,005 -0,004 -0,005 -0,006 -0,006 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,004
-0,519 -0,433 -0,555 -1,217 -0,914 -1,289 -1,494 -1,552 -1,273 -1,545 -1,390 -1,141
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
ACARL  -  ACARW
t-STAT
WINNERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
FORMATION PERIOD
LOSERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
   
 
Table A - Differences in Cumulative Average (Market-Adjusted) Residual Returns Between the Winner and Loser Portfolios into months 13-24 of the Test 
period  
 
Differnces in Cumulative (market-Ad 
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25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
-0,005 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,002 -0,003
-0,006 -0,007 -0,007 -0,007 -0,007 -0,006 -0,006 -0,006 -0,007 -0,007 -0,006 -0,006
-0,011 -0,010 -0,010 -0,011 -0,009 -0,010 -0,009 -0,010 -0,009 -0,010 -0,012 -0,014
-0,007 -0,008 -0,009 -0,009 -0,008 -0,007 -0,005 -0,005 -0,002 -0,003 -0,003 -0,002
0,002 0,009 0,009 0,007 0,006 0,005 0,006 0,008 0,008 0,007 0,005 0,003
-0,014 -0,013 -0,014 -0,015 -0,014 -0,013 -0,015 -0,014 -0,014 -0,014 -0,013 -0,013
-0,006 -0,009 -0,010 -0,014 -0,013 -0,014 -0,015 -0,013 -0,012 -0,014 -0,014 -0,015
-0,025 -0,023 -0,022 -0,024 -0,024 -0,023 -0,022 -0,020 -0,017 -0,019 -0,019 -0,019
ACARL -0,009 -0,008 -0,008 -0,010 -0,009 -0,009 -0,009 -0,008 -0,007 -0,008 -0,008 -0,009
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
-0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004
-0,002 -0,001 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001
-0,003 -0,001 -0,002 -0,003 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,003 -0,003 -0,004 -0,004 -0,005
-0,005 -0,004 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,006 -0,005 -0,004 -0,003 -0,004 -0,005 -0,004
-0,001 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 -0,002 -0,001 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002
-0,006 -0,005 -0,005 -0,006 -0,006 -0,006 -0,007 -0,006 -0,007 -0,008 -0,008 -0,007
-0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,003 -0,003 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004
-0,012 -0,012 -0,012 -0,011 -0,010 -0,010 -0,011 -0,012 -0,012 -0,012 -0,013 -0,013
ACARW -0,005 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005
-0,004 -0,004 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,004 -0,004 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003
-1,344 -1,111 -1,193 -1,518 -1,447 -1,500 -1,330 -1,093 -0,990 -0,991 -0,962 -1,127
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
ACARL  -  ACARW
t-STAT
WINNERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
FORMATION PERIOD
LOSERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
   
 
Table A - Differences in Cumulative Average (Market-Adjusted) Residual Returns Between the Winner and Loser Portfolios into months 25-36 of the Test 
period  
 
Differnces in Cumulative (market-Ad 
  -31- 
Table B 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
-0,032 0,008 0,010 -0,007 -0,016 0,010 -0,010 0,002 -0,002 -0,013 -0,006 -0,013
0,026 0,017 0,009 -0,019 0,005 0,009 -0,028 -0,022 0,018 -0,012 -0,005 -0,006
0,000 -0,005 0,004 0,024 -0,003 -0,005 -0,071 0,034 -0,039 0,020 -0,034 -0,035
0,009 -0,077 0,015 0,029 0,011 -0,012 -0,032 -0,008 0,004 -0,024 0,029 -0,029
-0,024 0,029 0,010 -0,011 0,154 0,040 -0,021 0,074 0,099 0,026 -0,055 -0,184
-0,014 0,002 -0,015 -0,013 -0,028 0,002 -0,013 -0,046 -0,036 -0,044 -0,015 -0,038
0,031 0,034 -0,079 0,041 0,049 -0,034 -0,093 0,036 -0,034 0,009 -0,063 -0,031
-0,044 -0,019 0,048 -0,154 -0,022 -0,057 -0,020 -0,029 -0,037 -0,063 -0,089 -0,042
ARL -0,006 -0,001 0,000 -0,014 0,019 -0,006 -0,036 0,005 -0,003 -0,012 -0,030 -0,047
-0,631 -0,105 0,017 -0,641 0,894 -0,546 -3,411 0,360 -0,187 -1,144 -2,198 -2,370
0,027 0,035 0,037 0,061 0,060 0,030 0,030 0,040 0,047 0,031 0,038 0,057
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
-0,019 -0,014 0,008 -0,009 -0,013 0,041 -0,020 0,009 -0,004 -0,007 0,001 -0,015
-0,003 0,012 -0,003 -0,013 0,004 0,020 -0,013 -0,013 0,012 -0,009 0,009 -0,009
0,028 -0,021 -0,006 0,006 -0,019 -0,012 -0,053 0,035 -0,019 0,039 0,048 -0,056
0,020 -0,044 0,009 -0,005 0,006 0,021 -0,007 0,052 -0,010 -0,051 0,003 -0,035
0,030 0,035 0,026 -0,044 0,007 -0,025 -0,010 -0,022 0,028 -0,034 0,000 -0,020
0,057 -0,013 -0,056 0,057 -0,058 -0,027 -0,006 0,035 -0,020 -0,028 0,008 -0,021
0,036 0,033 -0,026 -0,055 0,016 0,036 -0,056 -0,030 -0,026 0,012 -0,037 -0,011
-0,072 0,009 -0,042 -0,004 0,022 0,003 -0,075 -0,035 -0,022 -0,001 0,001 -0,019
ARW 0,010 0,000 -0,011 -0,008 -0,004 0,007 -0,030 0,004 -0,008 -0,010 0,004 -0,023
0,671 -0,048 -1,148 -0,700 -0,473 0,752 -3,095 0,327 -1,149 -0,975 0,518 -4,186
0,040 0,027 0,028 0,034 0,025 0,026 0,027 0,034 0,019 0,028 0,023 0,016
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
t-STAT
STD DEVIATION
STD DEVIATION
WINNERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
t-STAT
FORMATION PERIOD
LOSERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
 
Table B – Testing whether the Average (Market-Adjusted) Residual Returns of the Winner and Loser Portfolios are different from zero into months 1-12 of 
the Test period  
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
0,007 -0,002 -0,002 0,002 -0,013 -0,007 -0,001 0,004 -0,001 -0,019 -0,008 -0,014
0,004 -0,021 0,015 -0,027 -0,012 0,014 -0,020 0,003 -0,013 -0,017 -0,018 -0,017
-0,008 0,009 -0,046 0,015 -0,034 -0,045 -0,010 0,035 -0,011 -0,037 -0,012 0,000
-0,003 0,043 0,025 -0,026 -0,008 -0,030 -0,014 0,045 0,029 -0,055 -0,049 -0,064
0,123 0,031 -0,031 -0,106 -0,016 0,006 -0,007 -0,054 -0,015 -0,022 0,029 -0,072
0,018 0,039 0,052 -0,054 -0,044 -0,031 -0,031 -0,034 -0,019 -0,021 -0,010 -0,039
0,026 -0,016 -0,086 -0,014 -0,027 -0,037 -0,059 0,022 0,190 -0,013 -0,025 -0,001
0,030 -0,002 -0,027 -0,018 -0,002 0,008 -0,028 0,002 -0,020 -0,009 0,008 -0,023
ARL 0,025 0,010 -0,012 -0,028 -0,020 -0,015 -0,021 0,003 0,017 -0,024 -0,011 -0,029
1,676 1,146 -0,800 -2,145 -3,947 -1,888 -3,271 0,248 0,688 -4,517 -1,314 -2,988
0,042 0,025 0,044 0,038 0,014 0,023 0,018 0,033 0,072 0,015 0,023 0,027
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
-0,031 0,001 -0,002 -0,009 -0,001 -0,035 0,016 0,001 0,008 -0,009 -0,012 0,010
0,000 -0,011 0,017 -0,018 0,004 0,009 -0,018 -0,007 0,002 0,008 -0,006 0,005
0,003 -0,013 -0,008 0,010 -0,169 0,137 -0,024 0,051 0,012 -0,021 -0,035 -0,011
-0,006 0,018 0,004 -0,009 0,002 0,020 -0,026 0,006 0,010 0,002 -0,021 -0,030
0,004 0,003 0,008 -0,005 0,010 -0,015 0,023 0,002 -0,003 -0,013 -0,003 -0,007
0,019 0,001 0,003 -0,013 -0,005 -0,020 0,026 -0,018 -0,022 -0,011 -0,032 -0,012
0,025 0,009 -0,032 0,006 0,007 0,002 -0,007 0,009 -0,027 0,002 0,003 -0,253
0,020 0,022 -0,003 0,151 -0,151 0,004 0,003 -0,010 -0,005 -0,006 -0,060 -0,038
ARW 0,004 0,004 -0,002 0,014 -0,038 0,013 -0,001 0,004 -0,003 -0,006 -0,021 -0,042
0,671 0,851 -0,325 0,713 -1,408 0,677 -0,105 0,593 -0,623 -1,763 -2,802 -1,376
0,018 0,012 0,014 0,056 0,076 0,053 0,021 0,021 0,014 0,010 0,021 0,087
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
t-STAT
STD DEVIATION
STD DEVIATION
WINNERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
t-STAT
FORMATION PERIOD
LOSERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
 
Table B – Testing whether the Average (Market-Adjusted) Residual Returns of the Winner and Loser Portfolios are different from zero into months 13-24 
of the Test period  
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25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
0,008 0,010 0,003 0,003 0,000 -0,001 0,011 -0,007 0,004 0,006 0,007 -0,015
-0,048 -0,019 -0,007 -0,015 0,007 0,003 0,003 -0,001 -0,026 -0,013 0,027 0,004
-0,014 0,006 -0,013 -0,025 0,039 -0,038 0,020 -0,035 -0,001 -0,042 -0,063 -0,073
0,024 -0,048 -0,037 -0,009 0,042 -0,002 0,056 0,010 0,077 -0,022 -0,019 0,046
0,056 0,181 0,010 -0,061 -0,017 -0,025 0,041 0,077 -0,010 -0,024 -0,049 -0,064
0,080 0,008 -0,032 -0,043 0,004 0,027 -0,067 0,005 -0,025 -0,008 0,033 -0,037
0,015 -0,076 -0,049 -0,107 0,007 -0,037 -0,047 0,065 0,000 -0,060 -0,014 -0,061
-0,010 0,010 0,004 -0,058 -0,032 0,010 -0,010 0,048 0,071 -0,061 -0,040 -0,010
ARL 0,014 0,009 -0,015 -0,039 0,006 -0,008 0,001 0,020 0,011 -0,028 -0,015 -0,026
0,974 0,333 -1,950 -3,108 0,721 -0,945 0,063 1,464 0,793 -3,269 -1,188 -1,845
0,041 0,077 0,022 0,036 0,025 0,023 0,042 0,039 0,040 0,024 0,035 0,040
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
-0,010 0,006 0,003 0,007 0,011 -0,011 0,000 -0,025 -0,002 -0,013 0,007 -0,017
-0,025 0,011 -0,009 -0,001 0,000 0,004 0,012 -0,010 -0,004 0,008 -0,013 0,008
0,036 0,028 -0,023 -0,027 0,019 -0,007 0,007 -0,023 0,004 -0,036 -0,013 -0,041
-0,048 0,007 -0,002 -0,022 -0,004 -0,031 0,030 0,008 0,051 -0,039 -0,039 0,023
0,000 -0,006 0,002 0,016 -0,014 -0,003 -0,024 0,012 -0,012 0,001 -0,019 -0,006
-0,005 0,020 -0,007 -0,027 -0,008 -0,001 -0,019 0,004 -0,025 -0,042 -0,003 0,014
0,241 -0,013 0,006 -0,014 -0,015 -0,001 0,007 0,071 -0,007 -0,033 -0,028 0,005
-0,002 -0,008 -0,011 0,016 0,015 -0,002 -0,031 -0,044 -0,015 -0,028 -0,036 -0,026
ARW 0,023 0,006 -0,005 -0,007 0,001 -0,006 -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,023 -0,018 -0,005
0,726 1,137 -1,535 -1,042 0,128 -1,698 -0,290 -0,078 -0,159 -3,392 -3,207 -0,670
0,091 0,014 0,009 0,018 0,013 0,011 0,021 0,035 0,023 0,019 0,016 0,022
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
t-STAT
STD DEVIATION
STD DEVIATION
WINNERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
01/01/2000-31/12/2002
01/01/2003-31/12/2005
01/01/2006-31/12/2008
01/01/2009-31/12/2011
t-STAT
FORMATION PERIOD
LOSERS
01/01/1988-31/12/1990
01/01/1991-31/12/1993
01/01/1994-31/12/1996
01/01/1997-31/12/1999
 
 
Table B – Testing whether the Average (Market-Adjusted) Residual Returns of the Winner and Loser Portfolios are different from zero into months 25-36 
of the Test period  
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